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Abstract— In this paper, we propose a scheme, called the
algebraic watchdog for wireless network coding, in which nodes
can detect malicious behaviors probabilistically, police their
downstream neighbors locally using overheard messages, and,
thus, provide a secure global self-checking network. Unlike tra-
ditional Byzantine detection protocols which are receiver-based,
this protocol gives the senders an active role in checking the node
downstream. This work is inspired by Marti et al.’s watchdog-
pathrater, which attempts to detect and mitigate the effects of
routing misbehavior.
As the first building block of a such system, we focus on a
two-hop network. We present a graphical model to understand
the inference process nodes execute to police their downstream
neighbors; as well as to compute, analyze, and approximate the
probabilities of misdetection and false detection. In addition,
we present an algebraic analysis of the performance using an
hypothesis testing framework, that provides exact formulae for
probabilities of false detection and misdetection.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been numerous contributions to secure wireless
networks, including key management, secure routing, Byzan-
tine detection, and various protocol designs (for a general
survey on this topic, see [1]). We focus on Byzantine detection.
The traditional approach is receiver-based – i.e. the receiver
of the corrupted data detects the presence of an upstream
adversary. However, this detection may come too late as the
adversary is partially successful in disrupting the network
(even if it is detected). It has wasted network bandwidth, while
the source is still unaware of the need for retransmission.
Reference [2] introduces a protocol for routing wireless net-
works, called the watchdog and pathrater, in which upstream
nodes police their downstream neighbors using promiscuous
monitoring. Promiscuous monitoring means that if a node A
is within range of a node B, it can overhear communication
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to and from B even if those communication do not directly
involve A. This scheme successfully detects adversaries and
removes misbehaving nodes from the network by dynamically
adjusting the routing paths. However, the protocol requires a
significant overhead (12% to 24%) owing to increased control
traffic and numerous cryptographic messages.
Our goal is to design/analyze a watchdog-inspired protocol
for wireless networks using network coding. Network coding
[3][4] is advantageous as it not only increases throughput and
robustness against failures and erasures but also it is resilient
in dynamic/unstable networks where state information may
change rapidly or may be hard to obtain. Taking advantage of
the wireless setting, we propose a scheme for coded networks,
in which nodes can verify probabilistically, and police their
neighbors locally using promiscuous monitoring. Our ultimate
goal is a robust self-checking network. In this paper, we present
the first building block of a such system, and analyze the
algebraic watchdog protocol for a two-hop network.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
the background and related material. In Section III, we intro-
duce our problem statement and network model. In Section
IV, we analyze the protocol for a simple two-hop network,
first algebraically in Section IV-B and then graphically in
Section IV-A. In Section V, we summarize our contribution
and discuss some future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
A. Secure Network Coding
Network coding, first introduced in [3], allows algebraic
mixing of information in the intermediate nodes. This mixing
has been shown to have numerous performance benefits. It is
known that network coding maximizes throughput [3], as well
as robustness against failures [4] and erasures [5]. However, a
major concern for network coding system is its vulnerability to
Byzantine adversaries. A single corrupted packet generated by
a Byzantine adversary can contaminate all the information to
a destination, and propagate to other destinations quickly. For
example, in random linear network coding [5], one corrupted
packet in a generation (i.e. a fixed set of packets) can prevent
a receiver from decoding any data from that generation even
if all the other packets it has received are valid.
There are several papers that attempt to address this prob-
lem. One approach is to correct the errors injected by the
Byzantine adversaries using network error correction [6]. They
bound the maximum achievable rate in an adversarial setting,
and generalizes the Hamming, Gilbert-Varshamov, and Single-
ton bounds. Jaggi et al.[7] propose a distributed, rate-optimal,
network coding scheme for multicast network that is resilient
in the presence of Byzantine adversaries for sufficiently large
field and packet size. Reference [8] generalizes [7] to provide
correction guarantees against adversarial errors for any given
field and packet size. In [9], Kim et al.compare the cost and
benefit associated with these Byzantine detection schemes in
terms of transmitted bits by allowing nodes to employ the
detection schemes to drop polluted data.
B. Secure Routing Protocol: Watchdog and Pathrater
The problem of securing networks in the presence of
Byzantine adversaries has been studied extensively, e.g.
[10],[11],[12]. The watchdog and pathrater [2] are two ex-
tensions to the Dynamic Source Routing [13] protocol that
attempt to detect and mitigate the effects of routing misbehav-
ior. The watchdog detects misbehavior based on promiscuous
monitoring of the transmissions of the downstream node to
confirm if this relay correctly forwards the packets it receives.
If a node bound to forward a packet fails to do so after a
certain period of time, the watchdog increments a failure rating
for that node and a node is deemed to be misbehaving when
this failure rating exceeds a certain threshold. The pathrater
then uses the gathered information to determine the best
possible routes by avoiding misbehaving nodes. This mech-
anism, which does not punish these nodes (it actually relieves
them from forwarding operations), provides an increase in the
throughput of networks with misbehaving nodes.
C. Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis testing is a method of deciding which of the two
hypotheses, denoted H0 and H1, is true, given an observation
denoted as U . In this paper, H0 is the hypothesis that R is well-
behaving, H1 is that R is malicious, and U is the information
gathered from overhearing. The observation U is distributed
differently depending whether H0 or H1 is true, and these
distributions are denoted as PU|H0 and PU|H1 respectively.
An algorithm is used to choose between the hypotheses
given the observation U . There are two types of error associ-
ated with the decision process:
• Type 1 error, False detection: Accepting H1 when H0 is
true (i.e. considering a well-behaving R to be malicious),
and the probability of this event is denoted γ.
• Type 2 error, Misdetection: Accepting H0 when H1 is
true (i.e. considering a malicious R to be well-behaving),
and the probability of this event is denoted β.
The Neyman-Pearson theorem gives the optimal decision rule
that given the maximal tolerable β, we can minimize γ by
accepting hypothesis H0 if and only if log
PU|H0
PU|H1
≥ t for
some threshold t dependant on γ. For more thorough survey
on hypothesis testing in the context of authentication, see [14].
D. Notations and definitions
We shall use elements from a field, and their bit-
representation. To avoid confusion, we use the same character
in italic font (i.e. x) for the field element, and in bold font (i.e.
x) for the bit-representation. We use underscore bold font (i.e.
x) for vectors. For arithmetic operations in the field, we shall
use the conventional notation (i.e. +,−, ·). For bit-operation,
we shall use ⊕ for addition, and ⊗ for multiplication.
We also require polynomial hash functions defined as fol-
lows (for a more detailed discussion on this topic, see [15]).
Definition 1 (Polynomial hash functions): For a finite
field F and d ≥ 1, the class of polynomial hash functions on
F is defined as follows:
Hd(F) = {ha|a = 〈a0, ..., ad〉 ∈ F
d+1},
where ha(x) =
∑d
i=0 aix
i for x ∈ F.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We model a wireless network with a hypergraph G =
(V,E1, E2), where V is the set of the nodes in the network, E1
is the set of hyperedges representing the connectivity (wireless
links), and E2 is the set of hyperedges representing the inter-
ference. We use the hypergraph to capture the broadcast nature
of the wireless medium. If (v1, v2) ∈ E1 and (v1, v3) ∈ E2
where v1, v2, v3 ∈ V , then there is an intended transmission
from v1 to v2, and v3 can overhear this transmission (possibly
incorrectly). There is a certain transition probability associated
with the interference channels known to the nodes, and we
model them with binary channels.
A node vi ∈ V transmits coded information xi by trans-
mitting a packet pi, where pi = [ai,hIi ,hxi ,xi] is a {0, 1}-
vector. A valid packet pi is defined as below:
• ai corresponds to the coding coefficients αj , j ∈ Ii,
where Ii ⊆ V is the set of nodes adjacent to vi in E1,
• hIi corresponds to the hash h(xj), vj ∈ Ii where h(·) is
a h-bit polynomial hash function,
• hxi corresponds to the polynomial hash h(xi),
• xi is the n-bit representation of xi =
∑
j∈I αjxj .
We assume that the hash function used, h(·), is known to
all nodes, including the adversary. In addition, we assume
that ai, hIi and hxi are part of the header information, and
are sufficiently coded to allow the nodes to correctly receive
them even under noisy channel conditions. Therefore, if a node
overhears the transmission of pi, it may not be able to correctly
receive xi, but it receives αj and h(xj) for vj ∈ Ii, and
h(xi). Protecting the header sufficiently will of course induce
some overhead, but the assumption remains a reasonable one
to make. First, the header is smaller than the message itself.
Second, even in the routing case, the header and the state
information must to be coded sufficiently. Third, the hashes
hIi and hxi are contained within one hop – i.e. a node that
receives pi = [ai,hIi ,hxi ,xi] does not need to repeat hIi , thus
sending only hxi . Therefore, the overhead associated with the
hashes is proportional to the in-degree of a node, and does not
accumulate with the routing path length.
Fig. 1. A valid packet pi sent by well-behaving R
Assume that vi transmits pi = [ai,hIi ,hxi , xˆi], where
xˆi = xi ⊕ e, e ∈ {0, 1}n. If vi is misbehaving, then e 6= 0.
It is important to note that the adversary can choose any e;
thus, the adversary can choose the message xˆi. Our goal is
to detect with high probability when e 6= 0. Note that even
if |e| is small (i.e. the hamming distance between xˆi and xi
is small), the algebraic interpretation of xˆi and xi may differ
significantly. For example, consider n = 4, xˆi = [0000], and
xi = [1000]. Then, e = [1000] and |e| = 1. However, the
algebraic interpretation of xˆi and xi are 0 and 8. Thus, even
a single bit flip can alter the message very significantly.
Our goal is to explore an approach to detect and prevent
malicious behaviors in wireless networks using network cod-
ing. The scheme takes advantage of the wireless setting, where
neighbors can overhear others’ transmissions albeit with some
noise, to verify probabilistically that the next node in the path
is behaving given the overheard transmissions.
IV. TWO-HOP NETWORK
Consider a network (or a small neighborhood of nodes in a
larger network) with nodes v1, v2, ...vm, vm+1, vm+2. Nodes
vi, i ∈ [1,m], want to transmit xi to vm+2 via vm+1. A
single node vi, i ∈ [1,m], cannot check whether vm+1 is
misbehaving or not even if vi overhears xm+1, since without
any information about xj for j ∈ [1,m], xm+1 is completely
random to vi. On the other hand, if vi knows xm+1 and xj
for all j ∈ [1,m], then vi can verify that vm+1 is behaving
with certainty; however, this requires at least m−1 additional
reliable transmissions to vi.
Fig. 2. A wireless network with m = 3.
Therefore, we take advantage of the wireless setting, in
which nodes can overhear their neighbors’ transmissions. In
Figure 2, we use the solid lines to represent the intended
channels E1, and dotted lines for the interference channels E2
Fig. 3. A wireless network with m = 2.
which we model with binary channels as mentioned in Section
III. Each node checks whether its neighbors are transmitting
values that are consistent with the gathered information. If a
node detects that its neighbor is misbehaving, then it can alert
other nodes in the network and isolate the misbehaving node.
As outlined in Section II-C, we denote the hypothesis that
R is well-behaving by H0, and H1 corresponds to that of
a malicious R. In the next subsections, we shall use an
example with m = 2, as shown Figure 3, to introduce the
graphical model which explains how a node vi checks its
neighbor’s behavior. Then, we use an algebraic approach to
analyze/compute γ and β for this example network.
A. Graphical model approach
In this section, we present a graphical approach to model
this problem systematically, and to explain how a node may
check its neighbors. This approach may be advantageous as it
lends easily to already existing graphical model algorithms as
well as some approximation algorithms.
We shall consider the problem from v1’s perspective. As
shown in Figure 4, the graphical model has four layers:
Layer 1 contains 2n+h vertices, each representing a bit-
representation of [x˜2,h(x2)]; Layer 2 contains 2n vertices,
each representing a bit-representation of x2; Layer 3 contains
2n vertices corresponding to x3; and Layer 4 contains 2n+h
vertices corresponding to [x˜3,h(x3)]. Edges exist between
adjacent layers as follows:
• Layer 1 to Layer 2: An edge exists between a vertex
[v,u] in Layer 1 and a vertex w in Layer 2 if and only if
h(w) = u. The edge weight is normalized such that the
total weight of edges leaving [v,u] is 1, and the weight
is proportional to:
P(v| Channel statistics and w is the original message),
which is the probability that the inference channel outputs
message v given an input message w.
• Layer 2 to Layer 3: The edges represent a permutation.
A vertex v in Layer 2 is adjacent to a vertex w in Layer
3 if and only if w = c + α2v, where c = α1x1 is a
constant, v and w are the bit-representation of v and w,
respectively. The edge weights are all 1.
• Layer 3 to Layer 4: An edge exists between a vertex v
in Layer 3 and a vertex [w,u] in Layer 4 if and only if
h(v) = u. The edge weight is normalized such that the
total weight leaving v is 1, and is proportional to:
P(w| Channel statistics and v is the original message).
Fig. 4. A graphical model from v1’s perspective
Node v1 overhears the transmissions from v2 to v3 and from
v3 to v4; therefore, it receives [x˜2,h(x2)] and [x˜3,h(x3)],
corresponding to the starting point in Layer 1 and the desti-
nation point in Layer 4 respectively. By computing the sum
of the product of the weights of all possible paths between the
starting and the destination points, v1 computes the probability
that v3 is consistent with the information gathered.
This graphical model illustrates sequentially and visually the
inference process v1 executes. In addition, the graphical ap-
proach may be extend to larger networks. Cascading multiple
copies of the graphical model may allow us to systematically
model larger networks with multiple hops as well as m ≥ 3.
(Note that when m increases, the graphical model changes
into a family of graphs; while when n increases, the size of
each Layer increases.) Furthermore, by using approximation
algorithms and pruning algorithms, we may be able to simplify
the computation as well as the structure of the graph.
B. Algebraic approach
Consider v1. By assumption, v1 correctly receives a2, a3,
hI2 , hI3 , hx2 , and hx3 . In addition, v1 receives x˜2 = x2 + e′
and x˜3 = x3 + e′′, where e′ and e′′ are outcomes of the
interference channels. Given x˜j for j = {2, 3} and the
transition probabilities, v1 computes rj→1 such that the sum
of the probability that the interference channel from vj and v1
outputs x˜j given x ∈ B(x˜j, rj→1) is greater or equal to 1− ǫ
where ǫ is a constant, and B(x, r) is a n-dimensional ball of
radius r centered at x. Now, v1 computes X˜j = {x | h(x) =
h(xj)} ∩ B(x˜j, rj→1) for j = {2, 3}. Then, v1 computes
α1x1 + α2xˆ for all xˆ ∈ X˜2. Then, v1 intersects X˜3 and the
computed α1x1 + α2xˆ’s. If the intersection is empty, then v1
claims that R is misbehaving.
We explain the inference process described above using
the graphical model introduced in Section IV-A. The set
{x | h(x) = h(x2)} represents the Layer 2 vertices reachable
from the starting point ([x˜2,h(x2)] in Layer 1), and X˜2 is a
subset of the reachable Layer 2 vertices such that the total edge
weight (which corresponds to the transition probability) from
the starting point is greater than 1−ǫ. Then, computing α1x1+
α2xˆ represents the permutation from Layers 2 to 3. Finally,
the intersection with X˜3 represents finding a set of Layer 3
vertices such that they are adjacent to the destination point
([x˜3,h(x3)] in Layer 4) and their total transition probability
to the destination point is greater than 1− ǫ.
Note that a malicious v3 would not inject errors in hx3 only,
because the destination v4 can easily verify if hx3 is equal
to h(x3). Therefore, hx3 and x3 are consistent. In addition,
v3 would not inject errors in hxj , j ∈ I3, as each node vj
can verify the hash of its message. On the other hand, a
malicious v3 can inject errors in a3, forcing v4 to receive
incorrect coefficients α˜j’s instead of αj’s. However, any error
introduced in a3 can be translated to errors in x3 by assuming
that α˜j ’s are the correct coding coefficients. Therefore, we are
concerned only with the case in which v3 introduces errors in
x3 (and therefore, in hx3 such that hx3 = h(x3)).
Lemma 4.1: For n sufficiently large, the probability of false
detection, γ ≤ ǫ for any arbitrary small constant ǫ.
Proof: Assume that v3 is not malicious, and transmits x3
and hx3 consistent with v4’s check. Then, for n sufficiently
large, v1 can choose r2→1 and r3→1 such that the probability
that the bit representation of x3 = α1x1 + α2x2 is in X˜3 and
the probability that x2 ∈ X˜2 are greater than 1− ǫ. Therefore,
X˜3 ∩ {α1x1 +α2xˆ | ∀xˆ ∈ X˜2} 6= ∅ with probability arbitrary
close to 1. Therefore, a well-behaving v3 passes v1’s check
with probability at least 1− ǫ. Thus, γ ≤ ǫ.
Lemma 4.2: P(A malicious v3 is undetected from v1’s
perspective) is:
min
{
1,
∑r1→2
k=0
(
n
k
)
2(h+n)
·
∑r2→1
k=0
(
n
k
)
2(h+n)
·
∑r3→1
k=0
(
n
k
)
2h
}
.
Proof: Assume that v3 is malicious and injects errors
into x3. Consider an element z ∈ X˜3, where z = α1x1 +
α2x2+ e = α1x1+α2(x2+ e2) for some e and e2. Note that,
since we are using a field of size 2n, multiplying an element
from the field by a randomly chosen constant has the effect
of randomizing the product. Here, we consider two cases:
• Case 1: If x2 + e2 /∈ X˜2, then v3 fails v1’s check.
• Case 2: If x2 + e2 ∈ X˜2, then v3 passes v1’s check;
however, v3 is unlikely to pass v2’s check. This is because
α1x1 + α2(x2 + e2) = α1x1 + α2x2 + α2e2 = α1(x1 +
e1) + α2x2 for some e1. Here, for uniformly random
α1 and α2, e1 is also uniformly random. Therefore,
the probability that v3 will pass is the probability that
the uniformly random vector x1 + e1 belongs to X˜1 =
{x | h(x) = h(x1)}∩B(x˜1, r1→2) where v2 overhears x˜1
from v1, and the probability that the interference channel
from v1 to v2 outputs x˜1 given x ∈ B(x˜1, r1→2) is
greater than 1− ǫ.
P(A malicious v3 passes v2’s check) = P(x1 + e1 ∈ X˜1)
=
V ol(X˜1)
2n
,
where V ol(·) is equal to the number of {0, 1}-vectors in
the given set. Since V ol(B(x, r)) =
∑r
k=0
(
n
k
)
≤ 2n,
and the probability that h(x) is equal to a given value is
1
2h
, V ol(X˜1) is given as follows:
V ol(X˜1) =
V ol(B(x˜1, r1→2))
2h
=
∑r1→2
k=0
(
n
k
)
2h
.
From v1’s perspective, the probability that a z ∈ X˜3 passes
the checks, P(z passes check), is:
0 ·P(x2 + e2 /∈ X˜2) +
∑r1→2
k=0
(
n
k
)
2(h+n)
·P(x2 + e2 ∈ X˜2).
Similarly, P(x2 + e2 ∈ X˜2) =
Pr2→1
k=0 (
n
k)
2(h+n)
, and V ol(X˜3) =
Pr3→1
k=0 (
n
k)
2h
. Then, the probability that v3 is undetected from
v1’s perspective is the probability that at least one z ∈ X˜3
passes the check:
P(A malicious v3 is undetected from v1’s perspective)
= min{1,P(z passes check) · V ol(X˜3)}
Note that P(z passes check) · V ol(X˜3) is the expected num-
ber of z ∈ X˜3 that passes the check; thus, given a high
enough P(z passes check), would exceed 1. Therefore, we
take min{1,P(z passes check) · V ol(X˜3)} to get a valid
probability. This proves the statement.
Lemma 4.3: P(A malicious v3 is undetected from v2’s
perspective) is:
min
{
1,
∑r1→2
k=0
(
n
k
)
2(h+n)
·
∑r2→1
k=0
(
n
k
)
2(h+n)
·
∑r3→2
k=0
(
n
k
)
2h
}
,
where v2 overhears x˜3 from v3, and the probability that the
interference channel from v3 to v2 outputs x˜3 given x ∈
B(x˜3, r3→2) is greater than 1− ǫ.
Proof: By similar analysis as in proof of Lemma 4.2.
Theorem 4.4: The probability of misdetection, β, is:
β = min
{
1,
∑r1→2
k=0
(
n
k
)
2(h+n)
·
∑r2→1
k=0
(
n
k
)
2(h+n)
·
1
2h
r∑
k=0
(
n
k
)}
,
where r = min{r3→1, r3→2}.
Proof: The probability of misdetection is the minimum
of the probability that v1 and v2 misdetecting malicious v3.
Therefore, by Lemma 4.2 and 4.3, the statement is true.
Theorem 4.4 shows that the probability of misdetection
β decreases with the hash size, as the hashes restrict the
space of consistent codewords. In addition, since r1→2, r2→1,
r3→1, and r3→2 represent the uncertainty introduced by the
interference channels, β increases with them. Lastly and the
most interestingly, β decreases with n, since
∑r
k=0
(
n
k
)
< 2n
for r < n. This is because network coding randomizes the
messages over a field whose size is increasing exponentially
with n, and this makes it difficult for an adversary to introduce
errors without introducing inconsistencies.
Note that we can apply Theorem 4.4 even when v1 and
v2 cannot overhear each other. In this case, both r1→2 and
r2→1 equal to n, giving the probability of misdetection, β =
min{1,
∑r
k=0
(
n
k
)
/8h} where r = min{r3→1, r3→2}. Here, β
highly depends on h, the size of the hash, as v1 and v2 are
only using their own message and the overheard hashes.
The algebraic approach results in a nice analysis with
exact formulae for γ and β. In addition, these formulae are
conditional probabilities; as a result, they hold regardless
of a priori knowledge of whether v3 is malicious or not.
However, this approach is not very extensible as the number
of “reasonable” messages grows exponentially with m.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a scheme, the algebraic watchdog for coded
networks, in which nodes can verify their neighbors proba-
bilistically and police them locally by means of overheard
messages. We presented a graphical model for two-hop net-
works to explain how a node checks its neighbors; as well as
compute, analyze, and potentially approximate the probabili-
ties of misdetection/false detection. We also provided an alge-
braic analysis of the performance using an hypothesis testing
framework, which gives exact formulae for the probabilities.
Our ultimate goal is to design a network in which the
participants check their neighborhood locally to enable a
secure global network - i.e. a self-checking network. There are
several avenues for future work, of which we shall list only a
few. First, there is a need to develop models and frameworks
for the algebraic watchdog in general topology as well as
multi-hop networks. In addition, possible future work includes
developing inference methods and approximation algorithms
for nodes to decide efficiently whether they believe their
neighbor is malicious or not.
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